Bipin Deo

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to New Delhi for the BRICS Summit marks an important moment in India–China relations. It is his first visit to India in seven years and comes at a time when the relationship remains defined by a difficult combination of strategic competition, economic interdependence and unresolved border tensions.

The meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi was their 21st interaction. Over the years, their encounters at Wuhan, Mamallapuram, Kazan and elsewhere have demonstrated the importance both leaders attach to maintaining direct communication.

But the significance of the latest meeting lies not merely in the frequency of their interactions. It comes at a time when the international system itself is undergoing profound change.

From Border Tensions to Strategic Dialogue

For much of the period between 1988 and 2012, India–China relations were relatively stable along the disputed border. The situation changed considerably thereafter.

The confrontations at Depsang, Chumar, Doklam and Tawang, followed by the Galwan clash, transformed the strategic atmosphere. Trust between the two countries suffered, and border security became central to India's assessment of its relationship with Beijing.

At the same time, economic relations continued to grow. Bilateral trade has reached around US$151 billion, although the relationship remains heavily imbalanced in China's favour. Chinese imports have become an important component of India's manufacturing ecosystem, even as India seeks to reduce excessive dependence on any single external source.

This creates a fundamental contradiction. India and China are strategic competitors, but their economies remain deeply connected.

The border issue therefore cannot be viewed in isolation from the wider relationship. Nor can economic engagement automatically resolve strategic differences. What is required is a sustained political mechanism that allows the two countries to manage competition while identifying areas where cooperation remains possible.

A Changing Global Environment

The international environment is creating additional incentives for both countries to reassess their relationship.

China and India are both dealing with the consequences of shifting US trade and tariff policies. Energy prices, supply-chain disruptions and instability across Central Asia have added further uncertainty to the global economy.

Both countries also face security challenges. China has experienced terrorism and instability in Xinjiang, while Chinese citizens and interests have come under attack in Pakistan. India, meanwhile, continues to confront terrorism and Islamist extremism, including threats originating beyond its borders.

These common challenges do not erase the differences between Beijing and New Delhi. But they demonstrate that the two countries do not have completely divergent interests.

There are also broader changes in the global balance of power. India’s economic rise and its growing international influence are altering the strategic environment in Asia. China's concerns about India's expanding partnerships, including its participation in the Quad, must therefore be understood within this larger geopolitical context.

India, for its part, remains concerned about China's strategic relationship with Pakistan, Chinese military infrastructure and activity along the Himalayan frontier, and Beijing's position on issues concerning India's territorial integrity.

Neither side can wish away these concerns.

The BRICS Opportunity

This is where the Modi–Xi dialogue acquires significance beyond the bilateral relationship.

Both India and China increasingly speak of a multipolar international order and greater representation for the Global South. BRICS provides an institutional platform through which this convergence can be explored.

The New Development Bank is particularly important. Strengthening its capacity could provide developing countries with additional avenues for infrastructure and development financing, reducing excessive dependence on existing Western-dominated financial institutions.

India and China need not agree on every international issue to cooperate within such institutions.

Indeed, the test of strategic maturity is not whether two countries eliminate their differences. It is whether they can prevent those differences from overwhelming areas of mutual interest.

The same principle can apply to India–China economic relations. Greater trade and investment need not mean abandoning strategic caution. Equally, strategic competition should not automatically lead to the dismantling of every channel of economic engagement.

From Competition to Coexistence

The Modi–Xi meeting should therefore be viewed neither as a dramatic reset nor as evidence that the fundamental differences between India and China have disappeared.

The relationship remains complicated.

The border dispute remains unresolved. The trust deficit is real. China’s partnership with Pakistan continues to concern New Delhi. India’s growing strategic partnerships with the United States, Japan, Australia and other countries remain a source of concern in Beijing.

Yet perpetual confrontation is not inevitable.

India and China are two major civilisational states and among the world's largest economies. Their relationship will have a significant impact not only on Asia but also on the emerging global order.

The immediate objective should therefore be managed competition accompanied by sustained dialogue.

The two sides need mechanisms that can prevent border tensions from escalating, maintain military-to-military communication, expand economic engagement where interests coincide and strengthen cooperation through institutions such as BRICS.

The Modi–Xi meeting offers an opportunity to move in that direction.

The real measure of its success will not be the symbolism surrounding a leaders' meeting. It will be whether the dialogue produces durable mechanisms for managing differences.

India and China do not have to become allies. Nor do they have to agree on the shape of the international order.

But they have strong reasons to ensure that competition does not become permanent confrontation.

In an increasingly multipolar world, strategic coexistence between the two Asian powers may ultimately be less a choice than a necessity.

(The writer is a Nepal based geopolitics expert)